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Abstract
We investigate the eect of mobility of highly skilled workers in Denmark on the total patenting
activity of the rms involved for the population of R&D active Danish rms observed between 1999
and 2004. Our study documents how workers joining increase rms' patenting activity. The eect is
strongest if workers join from patent-active rms. We also nd evidence of a positive feedback eect on
patenting from workers who have left for another patent-active rm. Summing up the eects of joining
and leaving workers, we show that labor mobility increases the total innovative activity of the new
and the old employer. Our study thus provides rm-level support for the notion that labor mobility
stimulates overall innovation of a country or region.
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1 Introduction
Knowledge transfer resulting from labor mobility constitutes an important source of innovation and
growth. One stream of literature focuses on the eects of mobility on the innovation activities of indi-
vidual rms|typically, the rm hiring the worker|and explores many contingencies that moderate this
relationship (Boeker, 1997; Palomeras and Melero, 2009). From a more macro-perspective, studies within
economics, management strategy, and economic geography argue that a high level of labor turnover spurs
regional innovation performance (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Fallick et al., 2006). In this paper, we in-
tegrate these levels of analysis to study whether labor mobility increases the total R&D output of the
rms involved. In other words, we investigate whether the notion that labor mobility stimulates overall
innovation has a rm-level micro-foundation.
Various evidence from surveys, patent les, and court cases, shows that labor mobility is an important
channel of knowledge transfer between rms (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Hoti et al., 2006; Manseld, 1985).
The implications of this observation for rm strategy have been extensively investigated. The ndings show
that rms exploit the knowledge and skills brought by new recruits, to enter distant technological areas
(Palomeras and Melero, 2009; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Tzabbar, 2009), to introduce new types of
products (Boeker, 1997; Rao and Drazin, 2002), and to boost R&D output (Ejsing et al., 2013). Another
strand of the literature adopts the perspective of worker exits and how rm performance suers from
interruption to routines and loss of knowledge (Campbell et al., 2012; Wezel et al., 2006). However, the
departure of a worker also represents an opportunity for the rm to access the knowledge available at the
worker's new employer (Agrawal et al., 2006; Corredoira and Rosenkopf, 2010).
At the regional level, localized knowledge sharing has long been recognized as a major benet of
agglomeration (Jacobs, 1969; Marshall, 1920). Saxenian (1994) pointed to the particular importance
of labor mobility for regional innovation performance. In her comparative analysis of Silicon Valley in
California and Route 128 in Massachusetts, she argued that the \job-hopping" culture in Silicon Valley
creates tightly coupled social networks through which knowledge ows, causing rapid innovation and growth
in that region. Consistent with this view, subsequent studies document the co-existence of high labor
turnover and localized knowledge sharing among rms in the semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley
(Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Breschi and Lissoni, 2005; Fallick et al., 2006). The importance of labor
mobility is underlined also by more recent studies showing that regions characterized by strong enforcement
of trade secrecy laws and covenants not to compete experience lower rates of labor turnover but also less
patenting and entrepreneurship (Marx et al., 2009; Png, 2012; Samila and Sorenson, 2011).
Although the literature documents the importance of labor mobility for innovation in rms and in
regions, to our knowledge, there are no empirical studies providing quantitative evidence of the critical
link between these levels of analysis. Existing rm-level studies look at the eect of labor mobility on
the innovation activities of either the new or the old employer, and in regional-level studies the central
assumption is that labor mobility increases total innovation for the rms involved in the labor exchanges.
It is not a priori clear whether this condition holds since worker mobility may hurt the old employer more
than it benets the new employer. In this paper, we investigate the eect of mobility of highly skilled
workers in Denmark on the total patenting activity of the rms involved. We nd a signicant and positive
eect of labor mobility on total patenting if either of the rms involved has a history of patenting activity.
Mobility from and to patenting rms, that is, rms with a positive stock of existing patents, has the largest
marginal eect, namely 0.023 additional patent applications in the following year per mobile worker. For
the average rm in our sample, this implies a 36 percent increase in the number of patent applications.
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Our empirical ndings derive from an extensive data set that combines patent applications from Danish
rms to the European Patent Oce (EPO) with matched employer-employee registry data which essentially
contain a complete record of mobility in the Danish labor market. This contrasts with most existing studies
which trace mobility via patent les, meaning that mobility is observed only if an inventor applies for a
patent also at the new rm. We dierentiate among workers who joined the rm in the focal year (\joiners"),
workers who have been in the rm since the previous year (\stayers"), and workers who left in the previous
year (\leavers"). The focus is on R&D workers who we dene as individuals i) holding a university degree
in natural sciences, engineering and other technical elds, and ii) employed in positions classied as using or
producing knowledge at an advanced level. The point of departure of our empirical approach is a standard
rm-level patent production function (Hall et al., 1986; Hausman et al., 1984) that maps dierent types
of labor, capital, and other observed rm characteristics onto patent counts. To control for unobserved
permanent dierences in rms' patent productivity, we employ two dierent estimation approaches: The
pre-sample mean estimator (Blundell et al. 1995) and the dynamic xed-eect GMM estimator (Blundell
et al. 2002).
We nd that a joiner coming from a patenting rm is associated with a signicant increase in the
number of the new employer's patent applications. In relative terms, the joiner in this case contributes
six times more than a comparable stayer, while a joiner from a rm with no patent activity is no more
productive than a stayer. Our interpretation of this result is that, on average patent-active rms are more
R&D active, and thus constitute a richer source of valuable knowledge.
The relative magnitude of the contribution of joiners from patenting rms is sizable given that we
consider the eect of mobility of an average worker occupying a job function and in possession of the formal
qualications required to conduct R&D, whereas most existing studies consider \star scientists" with at
least two patented inventions. In the case of leavers, we nd that a worker who left to join a patenting
rm, is associated with a signicant increase in the present number of patent applications by the previous
employer. In the case of a worker who left to join a non-patenting rm there is no signicant concomitant
eect on patenting. To sum up, in relation to the eects of joiners and leavers, our analysis provides strong
support for the view that mobility of high-skilled workers stimulates total rm-level invention conditional
on at least one of the rms having been patent active in the past.
The analysis of the eect of mobility on total invention relies on two important advantages of our
data set. First, compared to most previous studies that use patent data to track inventor mobility, we
have a complete record of labor mobility. In addition to avoiding possible biases arising from unregistered
moves, this allows us to estimate the patent productivity of workers joining a rm, leaving, and staying
with a rm. Second, our dependent variable|number of patent applications|lends itself more naturally
to aggregation than other dependent variables which are employed in existing studies such as entry into
a new technology class or product area. A potential weakness of our analysis is that it does not include
variables for whether a mobility event resulted in actual knowledge transfer. This raises the concern that
the correlation between mobility and patenting observed in the data might be explained by factors other
than knowledge transfer. To address this issue, in an extension we show that labor mobility is positively
associated with the propensity of the rms involved to cite each other's patents, which we take as an
indication that the mobility event resulted in knowledge transfer. Moreover, we corroborate our causal
interpretation of the eect of mobility on invention by showing that the positive correlation between these
variables is not signicantly related to any large change in R&D employment. Finally, we apply instruments
for rm mobility based on industry averages in GMM estimation to take account of rm-specic shocks
to patent productivity. These additional analyses suggest that the relationship is not caused by some
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unobserved factor|such as a rm ramping up its R&D activity|which would increase both hiring and
patenting.
The papers closest to ours are Hoisl (2007) and Ejsing et al. (2013) which study the eect of labor
mobility on patenting. Hoisl (2007) combines data on mobility constructed from patent les, with back-
ground information on inventors obtained from questionnaires. She shows that mobile inventors are on
average more productive, and that mobility increases inventor productivity. However, since she does not
measure the previous employer's patent productivity she is unable to address the eect of mobility on the
total level of invention. Using similar data to ours, Ejsing et al. (2013) show that hiring researchers from
universities has a large eect on rm patenting but they do not address the issue of how worker mobility
aects total invention.
In a related literature stream, registry data is used to test a prediction of human capital theory that
workers who acquire valuable knowledge on the job receive a wage premium but pay for this through an
initial wage discount. Men (2005) nds evidence of such a wage prole but Maliranta et al. (2009) nd
that workers are not able to capitalize on the knowledge acquired from participating in R&D activities.
Toivanen and Vaananen (2012) nd a signicant and potentially long-lasting wage premium for inventors
of granted patents, indicating that these workers are perceived by their rms to possess valuable knowledge
and skills. However, our aim is to measure the importance of mobility for total invention.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical background to the
analysis and develops the argument that mobility occurs only if it increases the total invention of the rms
involved. Section 3 describes the data and outlines the denitions used in the analysis. Section 4 disucsses
our econometric approach and provides descriptive statistics. The main results are reported in Section 5
with some corroborating evidence and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 The Eect of Labor Mobility on Firm-Level Invention
We briey outline the main eects of labor mobility on rms' R&D capabilities identied in the literature.
Reallocation of skills and abilities: R&D workers possess technical skills and problem-solving abilities
which are important inputs for the production of inventions. Since these skills and abilities can only be
applied in one rm at a time, they are rival in nature (Arrow, 1962). That is, when a worker moves from
one rm to another, the R&D capability of the new and the old employer are respectively increased and
decreased.
Immediate knowledge transfer: Dierent pieces of knowledge are not necessarily equally widely dis-
tributed within the organization. Some knowledge is \private", resides within a single individual, and is
available only to the current employer. Other pieces of knowledge are \social" and shared among several
employees (Spender, 1996). So whether a particular piece of social knowledge can be transferred by a
single individual is a key issue. Knowledge regarding how a technical process works is an example of social
knowledge which can be individually transferable (Liebeskind, 1997) whereas implicit knowledge embedded
in the routines, culture, and norms of the rm is dicult for a single worker to transfer (Spender, 1996).
If a worker switches rms, the new employer gets access to the worker's private knowledge and the part
of the worker's social knowledge that is individually transferable. We refer to this as \forward knowledge
transfer" since knowledge and labor ow in the same direction. The old employer loses only the worker's
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private knowledge. Hence, mobility leads to sharing of social knowledge, which is the fundamental reason
why labor mobility is perceived as an important source of aggregate innovation (Saxenian, 1994; Franco
and Mitchell, 2008).
Social ties and attention: Agrawal et al. (2006) observe that mobility results in the old and the new
employers citing each other's patents more frequently. While the citing behavior of the new employer can be
explained by its use of the knowledge that the worker brings, the apparent existence of \reverse knowledge
transfer"|i.e. knowledge that ows in the opposite direction to labor|is striking. Two explanations for
this phenomenon have been proposed by Corredoira and Rosenkopf (2010). First, the worker may stay
in contact with former co-workers, resulting in knowledge exchange among the rms' employees. Second,
the old employer's awareness of the worker's new employer as a source of knowledge may be heightened
and may result in closer attention to the latter's patents and other R&D activities. Although our data do
not allow us to disentangle these explanations, the theoretical predictions are clear. The increased focus
of the involved rms on each other's activities, and the stronger personal ties among employees reinforce
the forward knowledge transfer for the new employer. Furthermore, reverse knowledge transfer alleviates
the loss of knowledge that the old employer experiences.
Putting together these three eects of labor mobility suggests that the new employer gains access to
new skills and knowledge. This should increase the rm's R&D capability, and in turn its invention output
based on new opportunities for knowledge recombination and possibilities to pursue new lines of research
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Schumpeter, 1934). The old employer experiences loss of the worker's
skills and private knowledge but might benet from reverse knowledge ows. Thus, the overall eect of
labor mobility on the old employer's R&D capability and invention output is a priori unclear. Our main
interest in this paper is how labor mobility aects aggregate invention. The above arguments suggest that
the invention output of the new employer increases while the invention output of the old employer may
decrease, leaving the total eect|the sum of the eects on the new and the old employers|indeterminate.
2.2 The Eect of Labor Mobility on Total Invention
In order to gain theoretical predictions, we treat the market for R&D workers as competitive and assume
that mobility occurs as the result of wage competition among rms. Assuming that a suciently large
proportion of moves happens endogenously due to wage competition|rather than for exogenous family-
related reasons for example|we would expect to nd empirical evidence consistent with the predictions of
this model.
Following Pakes and Nitzan (1984), we consider two rms competing for a worker currently employed
by one of the rms. If the current employer keeps the employee, it earns prot . If the worker moves,
the old and the new employer earn O and N, respectively. The prots O and N include all the
costs and benets that arise from labor mobility. Retaining the worker has value (1  O) to the current
employer and hiring the worker has value N to the potential new employer. Hence, wage competition
implies that mobility occurs if and only if (1  O) < N ,  < (N + O). In other words, mobility
occurs if and only if it increases the joint prot of the two rms (Pakes and Nitzan, 1984).
There are opposing eects of labor mobility on the joint prot of the rms (Combes and Duranton,
2006; Fosfuri and Rnde, 2004). First, social knowledge that was the sole possession of the old employer
before the mobility event is shared with the new employer. This leads to increased competition over some
commercial uses of the knowledge, reducing the prot of the old employer. Since competition destroys
rents, the new employer gains less from entry to these commercial uses than the old employer loses from
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increased competition. Increased competition tends to reduce the joint prot of the rms, and thus deters
labor mobility. Similarly, more mundane costs related to labor turnover, such as hiring and training
costs and costs resulting from interruptions to the workow, also tend to reduce joint prot and prevent
mobility. Second, labor mobility may increase the rms' joint prot through its eect on invention. Firms
have dierent R&D capabilities and strengths, and knowledge sharing increases the likelihood that a piece
of knowledge will serve as an input to a new invention (Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Scotchmer, 1991).
Therefore, knowledge sharing through labor mobility has the potential to stimulate invention, whether in
the form of greater variety, value, or speed of invention. This eect increases the rms' joint prot and
tends to facilitate labor mobility.
Taking these arguments together, the theoretical prediction is that labor mobility occurs if and only if
the positive eect from an increase in joint invention outweighs the negative eect of stronger competition
and other costs associated with labor mobility. Hence, we would expect the labor mobility that we observe
in our data to cause an increase in total invention.
3 Data
The core of our data set is patent applications to the EPO led between 1978 and 2006 with at least
one applicant with Danish residency. These data were retrieved from EPO's \PATSTAT" database.1 We
consider in our analysis patent applications up to and including 2004, since the database for the years after
2004 is incomplete. Our data set includes 12,873 patent applications.
We use patent applications rather than patent grants because the average grant time (4-5 years) for the
patents in our data set (Kaiser and Schneider, 2005) implies that a substantial number of patents applied
for during the time period considered for our estimation (2000-2004) would be lost were patent grants
used.2 The \time stamp" of the patent application is the \priority date", that is, the date of rst ling of
the invention for patent protection at the EPO or any national patent oce.
EPO data do not have a unique rm identication number of the type used by Statistics Denmark,
the provider of our rm-level and employee-level data. Therefore, we attached|mostly manually|our
EPO data to Statistics Denmark's rm identiers. We were able to assign rm identiers to 11,280 patent
applications. The unmatched applications primarily refer to rms that went out of business before 1999.
The corresponding information would in any case have been lost in our analysis, since our rm-level data
start in 1999. After matching these data with our rm-level information, we were left with 11,031 patent
applications applied for by 2,278 unique rms.
Statistics Denmark provided us with rm registry data, including most importantly rms' sectoral and
regional aliations and physical capital book value, and registry data on employee characteristics including,
most importantly the end-of-November number of employees and their highest level of education.3 We
discarded sectors with no EPO patent applications between 1978 and 2004. Sectors are dened according
1For information on this data set, refer to http://www.epo.org/patents/patent-information/raw-data/test/product-14-
24.html.
2There is a reporting lag between date of application and date of publication of the application in the EPO database.
This implies that not all patents applied for after 2004 had been registered in the database at the time of data collection. We
excluded these patents in order to avoid biases.
3As workers' rm aliations are registered only once a year, in November, we do not observe within{year mobility.
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to the three-digit NACE Rev. 1 industry classication. In a nal step, we merged the rm-level data
with employee-level data, which allows us to track the employment history of individual workers. We
excluded rms founded during the estimation period 2000-2004. As described further in Section 4, our
main estimation results are based partly on an estimator that requires information on rms' patenting
behavior prior to 2000. Finally, we discarded rms from the public sector, since its patenting behavior is
likely to be very dierent from that of industry.
When delimited according to these criteria, we have 349,595 observations for 93,725 rms in the popu-
lation of private rms in Denmark. Our main sample consists of observations for rms that employ at least
one worker in an R&D-related occupation. We focus on these since rms with employees in R&D-related
occupations are much more likely to patent than rms with no R&D workers. Of the 2,861 patent applica-
tions during 2000-2004 that could be denitively assigned to a rm, 2,728|or 95 percent|can be assigned
to rms with positive R&D employment. By excluding rms with very little or no current R&D activity,
we attempt to compare between dierent varieties of apples rather than between apples and oranges. Our
main estimation results thus include 42,507 observations for 14,516 unique rms, and 2,728 patents over
the period 2000-2004.
We dene R&D workers as those workers within a rm who are likely to be engaged in R&D related
tasks. Specically, we apply two main criteria to identify the relevant group of workers.4 First, the person
must have a Bachelor's, a Master's, or a Doctoral degree in technical or natural sciences, veterinary and
agricultural sciences, or health sciences.5 This criterion is based on the idea that knowledge ows are
associated mainly with mobility of high-skilled workers. The denition corresponds closely to the ndings
in Kaiser (2006) who uses patent inventor survey (PATVAL) data for Denmark to show that 30.5 percent of
inventors have Bachelor's degrees, 40.8 percent have Master's degrees and 17.4 percent have Doctorates. We
intend to capture all individuals possessing the formal skills necessary to perform R&D related activities
within the rm. Since some high-skilled workers may never conduct R&D we introduce the additional
criterion that a person's job function must involve use or production of knowledge at an advanced level.
This information is included in our data through the International Standard Classication of Occupations
(ISCO) coding applied by the International Labour Organization.6 At its rst-digit level, ISCO classies
occupations according to their knowledge content. In particular, we can distinguish between \professionals"
(level 2) and \technicians and associate professionals" (level 3).7 Individuals are categorized in the former
group if they work in a position in which they \increase the existing stock of knowledge, apply scientic
or artistic concepts and theories, teach about the foregoing in a systematic manner, or engage in any
combination of these three activities." We denote this group \R&D professionals". They are the focus of
our analysis of mobility since they are most likely to be directly involved in the creation of new knowledge.
Individuals categorized as technicians and associate professionals occupy support positions which more
likely utilize already existing knowledge. We call this group \R&D support workers". Since they are not
directly engaged in developing new knowledge, they are not expected to be the main carriers of knowledge
between rms. Therefore the share of the rm's support workers is included in our model as a control
4Other criteria are that the individual must not be retired, must be aged between 20 and 75 years, and must be employed
by a Danish rm (since we only have data on Danish rms at our disposal).
5The health sciences category includes many general practitioners and hospital doctors who a priori are not expected to
perform R&D related activities. Most of these will not be included in our estimations since we exclude the public sector.
6http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/intro.htm
7We include R&D managers (ISCO 1237) in the group of professionals. The codes are very detailed but a change in the
way individuals were classied in 2003 prevents us from using more narrowly dened occupations consistently over time.
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variable only.
To summarize, we dene R&D professionals as individuals with a technical or scientic degree who
perform job functions with an advanced knowledge content. R&D support workers have similar formal
skills but are employed in positions with less emphasis on the creation of new knowledge. Jointly, these
two groups constitute the current stock of the rm's R&D workers.
We next characterize categories of R&D professionals according to their mobility status. We dierentiate
between a main group simply termed joiners, who were employed in another rm in year t  1 (and hence
were not employed in rm i in year t  1), and other joiners, who are workers whose job market status in
year t   1 is unknown or who graduated between time t and time t   1. Stayers are R&D professionals
who were employed by rm i at time t   1 and time t. Finally, leavers are workers employed in rm i in
year t   1 who are employed in a dierent rm in year t. We also dierentiate mobile workers, joiners,
and leavers according to the patent activity of their old and new employers. Specically, we distinguish
between joiners who previously were employed by a \patenting rm", which we dene as a rm with a
positive patent stock at t   1, and joiners who previously were employed by a rm with no patents, a
\non-patenting rm". We distinguish also between leavers who joined patenting vs. non-patenting rms.
We do this to account for the inherent dierences between rms that are patent active (and most likely also
R&D active) and those that are not. Patent active rms are likely to possess a workforce that is endowed
with a deeper and broader knowledge base than rms that do not patent. When a worker from a patent
active rm joins a new employer, she may bring in a set of knowledge that is more valuable for invention.
Appendix A displays descriptive statistics for the variables involved in our estimations. The descriptive
statistics for the overall sample show that the rms in our sample are generally small: The average rm has
around eight R&D employees and a capital stock of about DKK78 mill. (the median is DKK2.7 mill.).8
The overall level of patenting is fairly low. The average rm applied for 0.06 patents per year during the
sample period.
We also provide descriptive statistics for the subset of rms which patented at least once before the
beginning of our sample period, so-called pre-sample patenters. These rms can be expected to patent
more regularly than the average rm for several reasons, including state dependence (Blundell et al. 1995)
and the likely presence of unobserved rm-specic factors that favor patenting. In addition, observable
rm characteristics are conducive to patenting for rms in this sub-sample compared to the average rm
in the full sample. We nd that rms with one or more pre-sample patents employ an average of 39 R&D
workers, employ a stock of capital of DKK400 mill. on average, and produce 0.76 patent applications per
year.
In relation to mobility and the composition of the R&D work force, our three groups of joiners (from
patenting rms, from non-patenting rms, other joiners) jointly constitute more than 20 per cent of the
current year's total employment of R&D professionals (joiners plus the reference category of stayers). The
overall level of mobility of R&D professionals is high compared for example to the annual turnover rate
of scientists and engineers of 13 per cent reported by Kim and Marschke (2005). The group of R&D
supporters amounts to 45.7 per cent of current R&D employment.
When comparing the subsamples of rms with or without any pre-sample patents, the share of support
workers is lower for pre-sample patenters (42.3 per cent) than for the other rms in our sample (46 per
cent). Pre-sample patenters also attract a larger proportion of their joiners from other patenting rms (2.6
per cent of the current R&D work force compared to 1.3 per cent for rms without pre-sample patents).
This is consistent with higher in-sample R&D intensity among \pre-sample patenters". The overall level of
8$US1 corresponds roughly to DKK5.7.
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mobility is comparable between the two sub-samples with 20 per cent of R&D professionals having joined
within a year in the case of pre-sample patenters against 23 per cent for rms without any pre-sample
patents.
Appendix B provides the correlations for the variables in our estimations. The table shows that our
explanatory variables are moderately correlated. This is conrmed by a variance ination factor of 1.86,
which is well below the critical value of 10 (Belsley et al. 1980).
4 Empirical approach
This section describes our patent production function and outlines the econometric approach employed to
estimate the relationship between worker mobility and rms' inventive output.
For the patent production function we assume a Cobb-Douglas specication as it is standard in the
literature (Blundell et al. 1995; Hausman et al. 1984; Kim and Marschke 2005). Our dependent variable
is the total number of a rm's patent applications in a given year, which we denote by P .9 It is a count
variable that takes the value zero or a positive integer. Hence we use count data models in the estimations.
The mean of the count variable is linked to the explanatory variables exponentially:
E(P ) = exp

ln(A) +  ln(QL) +  ln(K)

(1)
where QL denotes quality-adjusted R&D labor input and K denotes capital input. Our measure of labor
input is dened to be specic to a rm's R&D activities. In the case of capital, our data do not allow us
to measure the specic input of capital to R&D, hence we interpret capital stock as a general measure of
rm size. The variable A summarizes factors other than capital and labor that aect patent production
such as sectoral, geographical, and time eects which we also include in our empirical model.10
We choose an additive specication for quality-adjusted labor QL following Griliches (1967). We dif-
ferentiate between four main types of R&D labor currently employed in the rm, namely stayers (denoted
by St), joiners from rms (J), other joiners (O), and support workers (Su). Our specication for quality-
adjusted labor is:
QL = LSt + JLJ + OLO + SuLSu + XLX
= L

1 + (J   1) LJ
L
+ (O   1) LO
L
+ (Su   1) LSu
L
+ X
LX
L

; (2)
where current employment (L = LSt + LJ + LO + LSu) does not include leavers. We normalize the eect
of stayers to unity. The coecients r measure the contribution of the rth worker type to quality-adjusted
labor QL relative to the contribution of stayers.
Taking logs and using the approximation ln(1 + z)  z for small z we can plug the expression for
ln(QL) into the patent production function. This leads to our basic estimating equation which dierentiates
between dierent R&D worker types:
E(P ) = exp

ln (A) +  ln (L) + J
LJ
L
+ O
LO
L
+ Su
LSu
L
+ X
LX
L
+  ln (K)

;
9For brevity, we exclude explicit indices in what follows.
10Our econometric specication controls for sectoral aliation (15 sectors), ve dierent geographical regions, and time
eects. We lag all explanatory variables except for the time, region and sector dummies by 1 year to allow for time lags in
the R&D process and to alleviate concerns about reverse causality.
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where r = (r   1) for worker group r currently in the rm and X = X for leavers. Our estimations
identify the -coecients from which we shall back out the productivity ratios r. As discussed in Section 3,
our main specication also dierentiates between mobile workers who join from or leave to go to patenting
vs. non{patenting rms. This introduces Pr and 
N
r as a straightforward extension where the superscripts
P and N denote patenting and non-patenting rm, respectively.
The econometric models we apply will account for both state dependence in patenting activity and
unobserved rm heterogeneity. We account for patenting dynamics since existing rm-level studies show
that previous patenting activity has substantial positive eects on current patenting (Blundell et al. 1995,
1999, 2002; Crepon and Duguet 1997). Arguing that a rm's stock of past own patents represents knowledge
from which future patentable ideas can be derived, Blundell et al. include the lagged discounted stock of
patents as a regressor. Due to the relative short time span of our estimation sample, we follow Crepon and
Duguet (1997) and use a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a rm patented in t   1 as our
control for state dependence.
Likewise, our model allows for xed eects in order to capture unobserved rm-specic permanent
dierences such as appropriability conditions for R&D investments or dierent technological opportunities
that might aect current patenting. Estimating a simple model including a dummy variable for each rm
would produce consistent estimates only in count data models where all the regressors are strictly exogenous,
which clearly does not apply to a dummy variable related to past patenting activity, see Blundell et al.
(2002). This is similar to the bias introduced by the simultaneous inclusion in a linear model of xed eects
and a lagged dependent variable which renders the lagged dependent variable endogenous by construction
(Nickell 1981). To solve this problem, we consider two dierent xed eect approaches for dynamic count
data models: The Pre-Sample Mean (PSM) estimator of Blundell et al. (1995) and the GMM estimator
of Blundell et al. (2002). We discuss each model in turn.
The idea behind the PSM estimator is to approximate unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity by using
information on the rm's patenting behavior prior to the start of the estimation period. This is exactly the
setting in our data: We possess information on all rms' patenting activity from 1978 onwards, while our
explanatory variables (allowing for lags) are observed after 1999 only. The PSM estimator approximates
the \true" xed eect by the pre-sample patenting history of each rm, summarized by the term FE, which
in our case consists of patents applied for during the period 1978 to 1998. Specically, the PSM estimator
uses the average of the dependent variable over the pre-sample period as a proxy for the correlated eects
for each rm. Since a prominent feature of our data is an overall increase in the level of patenting during
the pre-sample period, we normalize the rm's number of patents in a pre-sample year by the total number
of patents applied for during that year.11
Since many of the rms in our data did not apply for patents during the pre-sample period, we follow
Blundell et al. (1995, 1999) and include a dummy variable for rms that applied for at least one patent
during the pre-sample period. This variable also serves to correct for the (arbitrary) small constant added
to the number of pre-sample patents to make log-transformation of FE feasible. It also remedies the so-
called \zero-ination problem" (Mullahy, 1997). It is common in analyses of economic count data to nd
excess numbers of zeros, a problem often treated by a zero-inated model. This model treats the selection
of rms into patenting as separate from the determination of the non-zero number of applications by actual
11Our approach hence allows for trends in patenting at the general level such as business cycle eects, changes in the
propensity of rms to patent rather than to opt for secrecy, or changes in the propensity of Danish rms to patent at the
EPO rather than the national patent oce.
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patenters. In section 5.3, we consider a zero-inated model as a robustness check and nd that our main
results hold qualitatively across alternative empirical approaches.
As an alternative to PSM estimation, Blundell et al. (2002) consider a GMM estimator which also
accounts for both xed eects and lagged dependent variables. This estimator is best compared to the
more popular dynamic panel data estimators for linear models (Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and
Bover 1995). We follow Kim and Marschke in applying a quasi-dierencing transformation to correct
for xed eects as suggested by Wooldridge (1991). It essentially removes the xed eects by a non-
linear transformation, much like the standard \within transformation" in linear models. The zero ination
problem is accounted for by the transformation as any time-invariant explanatory variable|including
variables that relate to the selection into patenting|are swamped by the xed eects. As in Blundell et
al. (2002) we use longer lags of our dependent variable as instruments for the lagged dependent variable.12
The GMM estimator accounts also for other variables apart from the lagged dependent being endoge-
nous. One potential concern is that causality may run not only from mobile workers to patent applications
(as it is assumed in our theoretical discussion) but also in the reverse direction. We discuss this concern
further in subsection 5.2 where we present evidence to corroborate our interpretation. Our GMM estimator
addresses this concern by instrumenting worker shares. As instruments we use the rms' own lagged shares
and the average share of each type of worker in other rms in the same sector and in the same region. The
intuition is that sector-specic and region-specic supply and demand shocks to other rms will aect the
demand for each skill group from the focal rm. At the same time, the average shares of the skill groups
of other rms are unlikely to be correlated with the error term of our equation of interest|unobserved
rm-specic factors that aect the rm's patent production.
The GMM estimator comes with a set of data requirements that considerably reduces the number of our
observations. The most binding requirement is that there must be at least three subsequent observations
per rm. The GMM estimator uses 23,769 observations for 6,751 rms while the PSM estimator uses
42,507 observations for 14,516 rms.
5 Results
5.1 Main results
Our estimation results are presented in Table 1. We report results for dierent count data specications
(Poisson and negative binomial) and for dierent estimators (PSM and GMM). We comment mainly on
the negative binomial PSM results which are our preferred results.
Looking at the eects of joiners, the statistical signicance of the -coecient of a group of R&D
joiners is relative to the reference group of R&D stayers. The sign tells us whether this R&D worker
type contributes more or less to patenting than stayers. The share of joiners from patenting rms has
the largest eect on patent productivity. However, joiners from non-patenting rms are not signicantly
more productive than stayers. We interpret the nding of stronger eects for joiners from patenting
compared to non-patenting rms as reecting that in the former case workers transfer knowledge valuable
for invention but not in the latter case.13 Hence our results suggest that any negative eects of intellectual
12To estimate the GMM model we use Windmeijer's (2002) \ExpEnd" program that runs under the software package
GAUSS.
13The reverse argument may hold that patenting rms have established a reputation for strict enforcement of patents in
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property protection and strategic litigation of departing employees are outweighed by positive knowledge
transfer eects. The heterogeneous group of \other joiners" also has a positive eect on patenting, which is
statistically highly signicant although smaller than the eect of joiners from patenting rms. This eect
is most likely due to the presence within this group of rm expatriates and graduates for example, an issue
analyzed in detail in Ejsing et al. (2013).
For the leaver groups, their -coecients show whether R&D workers of this type contribute to the
focal rm's patenting activity even though they are no longer employed by that rm. Our results show a
positive and signicant eect of leavers who left for a patenting rm but no signicant eect of leavers to
non-patenting rms. Again, this suggests that patenting rms are richer sources of knowledge.
Comparing the models in Table 1, we see the results are qualitatively very similar. The GMM Poisson
is estimated with less precision which is unsurprising given that it instruments the main mobility variables.
The only major dierence in the estimates is that the coecients of joiners from and leavers to patenting
rms are bigger in the GMM than the PSM. For our GMM approach to be valid, we require our instruments
to be strongly correlated with the mobility terms and simultaneously uncorrelated with the error term in
the patent production function. We test the rst property by running \rst stage" regressions of our
instruments and our exogenous variables on the endogenous variables. F-tests of joint signicance of
the instruments should be above 10 for them to be \suciently correlated" with the endogenous variables
(Stock et al. 2002). In our case, all F-statistics are substantially above 10. We consider the second property
by Hansen J-tests and nd no evidence against orthogonality of the instruments. The null hypothesis that
our instruments are orthogonal cannot be rejected at a marginal signicance level of more than 70 percent.
We base our further analysis on the PSM Negbin results since this model is indicated by a selection
test for overdispersion and incorporates a larger number of observations and rms than the GMM results.
Table 1 shows also that we nd substantial evidence of state dependence. This may reect sunk
costs associated with learning to conduct successful research or more practical knowledge related to patent
application ling. Our correction for unobserved heterogeneity in the PSMmodel has a signicantly positive
impact on current patenting activity. An increase in the number of pre-sample patents by 1 percent is
associated with an increase in the number of current patents of around 0.3 percent.
Insert Table 1 about here.
The coecients in Table 1 do not translate directly into marginal eects as in a linear model. To
facilitate interpretation of the magnitude of these eects, we convert the PSM NegBin estimates into
productivity ratios, the  terms discussed in section 4. The productivity ratios displayed in Table 2 show
that joiners from patenting rms are 6.3 times more patent productive than R&D stayers, a gure that
is statistically highly signicant. The related gures for other joiners from and for leavers to patenting
rms are 4.6 and 3.5, respectively. The remaining ratios are statistically insignicantly dierent from 1
indicating that these groups of R&D workers are no more productive than stayers.
Insert Table 2 about here.
Finally we evaluate the total eect of labor mobility on patenting which is the main focus of the
paper. We conduct a thought experiment designed to increase the rate of turnover while keeping R&D
order to reduce the risk of knowledge leaks due to worker exit (Agarwal et al. 2009). This would suggest a smaller eect of
mobility ows involving patenting rather than non-patenting rms, since the rm receiving the knowledge transfer might be
reluctant to use proprietary knowledge.
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employment unchanged. Going from period t  1 to t, our experiment replaces an incumbent worker with
a joiner, keeping total employment constant. Compared to the situation of no mobility, the eective labor
input QL will include an additional joiner eect, J , and an additional leaver eect X , while there will
be one less stayer in the rm in period t. The total eect of mobility then is calculated as the marginal
eect making this substitution. Partially dierentiating our patent production function, Equation (1), we
obtain the total eect of mobility as:
Total eect = @E(P )
@LiJ
+ @E(P )
@LjX
  @E(P )@LSt =
E(P )
L (
i
J + 
j
X); i; j 2 fN;Pg: (3)
The -coecients are found in Table 1 for dierent types of workers. The expected number of patents,
E(P ), and total R&D employment, L, are evaluated for an average rm in our sample as well as the average
of rms with at least one pre-sample patent. The results are shown in Table 3. The strongest eect is found
for the total eect of one worker leaving for a patenting rm and one worker joining from a patenting rm
while keeping total R&D employment constant. This results in an additional 0.020 patents for the average
rm in our sample, a 31 percent increase compared to the average number of patents. When evaluated
for the average for rms with at least one pre-sample patent, the same type of substitution yields 0.046
additional patents, an increase over the average number of patents of 6 percent.
For combinations of leavers and joiners that involve at least one patenting rm, we nd a positive and
statistically signicant eect of mobility on total patenting while mobility between non-patenting rms has
no signicant eect on total patenting. Overall, these ndings are consistent with our theoretical prediction
in section 2 that labor mobility increases the total innovative output of the rms involved.
Insert Table 3 about here.
5.2 Identication issues
Here we discuss our ndings and provide additional evidence to corroborate our interpretation of the main
results as being driven by knowledge spillovers from mobility. First, we establish a \paper trail" of patent
citation links between rms that are connected by labor ows. Second, we examine the relative importance
of another potential driver of our results, the \innovative thrust" created by a rm ramping up its R&D
activities to further exploit an already existing knowledge base in the rm. Third, we address the argument
in Kim and Marschke (2005) of preemptive patenting in the face of labor mobility. Finally, we discuss the
extent to which our results could be aected by positive assortative matching between workers and rms.
First, we want to verify that the probability of citation links between rms increases if there is movement
of labor between the rms. The presumption is that if a worker joins another rm and transfers knowledge,
there will be an increased likelihood of patent citations between the rms. Mobility between the rms can
go in either direction, or there might be a bi-directional exchange of labor. For the event that rm A, say,
cites rm B, we distinguish between (i) a forward \joiner" eect if one or more R&D workers join rm A
from rm B, and (ii) a reverse \leaver" eect if one or more R&D workers left rm A for rm B in the
previous period.
We construct a dyadic data set of all possible combinations of rms that patent within the present
period (\rm A") and rms which hold a positive patent stock at the beginning of the period (\rm B").
We dene indicator variables for i) the event of one or more workers joining rm A from rm B, and ii)
one or more R&D workers leaving rm A for rm B. For the case of bi-directional mobility, we dene a
separate indicator variable coded 1 if such bi-directional exchange occurred (and 0 otherwise). We set the
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forward and reverse mobility indicators to 0 if the bi-directional variable is coded 1. Finally, we dene
our dependent variable as an indicator of the existence of one or more citations in rm A's current patent
application, to a patent in rm B's patent stock.
Table 4 shows the results of linear regressions of the citations link variable on our three labor mobility
indicators (Probit regressions show very similar results and even stronger signicance.) The positive and
statistically signicant coecients of our three mobility dummy variables show that labor mobility is
positively associated with the probability of rm A citing a rm B patent. This holds for all three types
of mobility: A joiner's link, a leaver's link, and the bi-directional link. The key nding holds for the base
specication which includes the mobility terms only (1st column), for a specication where we control also
for industry and year (2nd column), and for rm characteristics (total number of R&D workers and size
of the patent stock of the cited rms, 3rd column) in addition to industry and year controls. The results
displayed in Table 4 strongly corroborate our interpretation of the results from the main empirical analysis:
Both forward and reverse labor mobility appear to be positively associated with knowledge ows.
Insert Table 4 about here.
The second issue we investigate is the relative importance of the \innovative thrust" interpretation of
our empirical results. The idea is that rms prepare to patent by investing heavily in R&D, investing in
a laboratory and lling it with R&D workers. If such an alternative interpretation holds, our estimated
joiner eect could simply be picking up massive R&D investments possibly unrelated to knowledge ows.
For the GMM results reported in Table 1, we note that instruments for rm mobility based on industry
averages are applied. Therefore these results are not sensitive to rm-specic increases in innovative thrust.
For the PSM estimation results, we provide an empirical check based on the presumption that innovative
thrust will be related to the establishment of new projects or entire new lines of business which, in turn,
are likely to be associated with large net additions to the stock of R&D workers in the rm. We re-run the
PSM estimations in Table 1 and interact the shares of joiners from patenting and non-patenting rms and
\other" joiners with a dummy variable that is coded 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the rm underwent a \large"
change in R&D employment. Statistical signicance of these interactions would provide evidence in favor
of the innovative thrust interpretation.
Our denition of a \large" change has to take into account that most rms are small and there are only
a few very large rms, measured by R&D employment. To do this we consider three dierent denitions
of a \large" change: The case where we require R&D employment to change by more than 100 percent or
by more than 10 workers; the case of R&D employment changing by more than 100 percent or by more
than 5 workers; and the case of R&D employment changing by more than 50 percent or by more than 10
workers. The second denition is more inclusive in terms of relative changes; the third denition is more
inclusive in terms of absolute changes.
Insert Table 5 about here.
Table 5 displays the estimation results. We nd the interaction terms neither individually nor jointly
to be signicantly dierent from zero. Hence we nd no evidence of the alternative innovative thrust
interpretation mattering signicantly for our ndings. Our main PSM estimation results in Table 1 remain
unchanged except for the eect of leavers which has the same sign and magnitude but is more imprecisely
estimated.
A third issue related to the interpretation of our results is the knowledge protection argument proposed
by Kim and Marschke (2005). It suggests that rms patent in order to prevent workers from transferring
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knowledge to other rms. However, the leaver eect we identify, on average materializes one year after the
worker has left the rm which makes it unlikely that the patenting activity is related to an attempt to
protect a specic invention that the departing worker had knowledge of. Furthermore, if we re-estimate the
model using two lags instead of just one for all R&D worker related variables, the estimated leaver eect
is only slightly lower. Although the order of magnitude is unaected, the leaver eect is less signicant
(p-value of 11 percent) than in the one-lag specication. This is likely due to a substantial reduction in
the sample size caused by the additional lag. It suggests that the eect is not driven primarily by any
protective measures taken by the old rm since they would need to be put in place soon after the worker
departed in order to secure priority over the invention.
Finally, although our data are very detailed about individual characteristics there is some concern
related to the selection of R&D workers with dierent unobserved ability or human capital endowment
into dierent types of rms. The thought experiment underlying our estimation of the total eect of
mobility assumes homogenous unobserved quality of joiners, leavers, and stayers. Following Becker (1973)
we might suspect that rms with the best conditions for conducting research may attract the best workers,
so-called \positive assortative matching". In relation to matching R&D workers to rms this would suggest
that workers in patenting rms are of higher quality on average than workers in rms with no previous
patenting activity. This could explain at least part of the dierence that we observe between the eects of
joiners from these two types of rms. However, a similar argument applies to the leavers' side. Leavers to
rms with previous patenting activity are on average of higher ability and the old rm suers a greater loss
of human capital for this group than for leavers to rms with no previous patenting. In this interpretation
of our results, selection may upwardly (downwardly) bias the eect on joiners (leavers) from (to) rms with
previous patenting activity. If the biases are approximately equal, the total eect of mobility in (3) will
remain unaected by the presence of matching. More importantly, even if the estimated eects of joiners
from patenting and non-patenting rms were entirely due to unobserved dierences in worker quality, our
key nding of a positive eect of mobility on total patenting would remain due to the (possibly downward
biased) leaver eect.
5.3 Robustness checks
We conduct ve dierent checks of the robustness of our results: (i) Accounting for patent heterogeneity
by weighting them according to the number of citations received, (ii) discarding the top 20 patenting rms,
or alternatively all the biotechnology rms, to check whether our main results are driven by selected rms,
(iii) applying a narrow denition of R&D worker by considering only workers with a Master's or Doctoral
degree, (iv) re-running the regressions without correcting for trends in overall patenting behavior, and (v)
using alternative estimators such as probit, Tobit, and zero-inated models. For reasons of space, the
results of these checks are not displayed here but can be found in the working paper version of this paper.
First there might be some concern that our estimates do not account for patent value heterogeneity.
It is well known that the distribution of the economic and technological value of patents is heavily skewed
in the sense that a few patents are very high value, while most are of very little value (see discussion in
e.g. Hall et al., 2005, Harho et al., 1999 and Lanjouw et al,. 1998). Trajtenberg (1990) shows that,
in the computer tomography industry, there is a close relationship between the number of citations a
patent receives (\forward citations") and the social value of an invention. He therefore suggests using
forward citations to approximate patent value since they capture the wide heterogeneity in the \quality"
or \importance" of patents. Like Trajtenberg (1990), we weight each patent by 1 plus the number of
14
citations the patent received within the three years after EPO publication. Our patent citation data are
from the \EPO/OECD patent citations database" which is available from the OECD (Webb et al., 2005)
and covers the period 1978-2006. The citations-weighted and citations-unweighted estimation results show
only slight dierences. The coecients in the estimates referring to joiners become slightly bigger, while the
coecients of leavers remain almost unchanged. Citation-weighting hence generates results that provide
even stronger support for our main result that mobility enhances total innovation.
There is a second concern related to whether our results are driven primarily by selected industries or
rms that are very patent active. We estimate our main specication again, excluding the biotechnology
sector or the 20 largest rms measured by their patent stocks in 2002. We nd that the results of the
estimations on these restricted samples dier very little qualitatively and quantitatively from our main
results based on the full data.
A third issue is related to our R&D worker denitions. The main worry is that their denition might
be too broad if it includes groups of workers who are unlikely to be engaged in research. The eect,
if any, would be to bias our main results downwards. To assess the likelihood of this, we apply a less
inclusive denition that selects only workers with a Master's or Ph.D. degree. While this restriction leads
to results that are qualitatively very similar to our main results, the coecients are generally smaller for
the narrower denition of R&D workers than for our main denition. In view of the survey evidence
reported by Kaiser (2006), we interpret this nding as meaning that workers with a Bachelor's level degree
constitute a signicant fraction of actual inventors in Denmark.
A fourth robustness check relates to our trend correction of correlated eects as discussed in section
4. Leaving out normalization for the general upward trend in patenting activity leads to results that are
qualitatively identical and quantitatively very similar.
As a fth robustness check we re-estimate our main model using alternative estimators. We run probit
and Tobit regressions as well as a zero-inated Poisson model. Although none of these estimators accounts
for rm xed eects, the positive eects of mobility reappear across the alternative estimation methods.
The share of joiners from patenting rms, as well as the share of \other joiners", remain strongly signicant
in the probit and Tobit models. For the count part of the zero-inated model we nd positive eects of
joiners although they are partly insignicant. The eect of leavers who left for patenting rms again is
strongly positive and signicant in the probit and Tobit models, but negative although insignicant for the
count part of the zero-inated model. The eects of the rm control variables (total R&D employment,
capital stock, and previous patenting) have the same signs as in our main results and are signicant
overall. The main dierence between the alternative estimators and our main results lie in the selection
part of the zero-inated model. This model estimates two equations, a probit model for having at least
one patent application, and a count model for number of patents conditional on a non-zero patent count.
Unsurprisingly, we nd that the share of a rm's R&D professionals who apply and develop advanced
knowledge, is a strong predictor of non-zero patent activity|reected by a negative sign on the share of
R&D support workers. The mobility terms show little signicance in the selection equation. However,
identication of the selection equation in this model is based entirely on functional form which may cause
diculties in separating out the eects on applying for one patent and the eects on applying for more than
one patent. It also explains a general lack of signicance of the results of the zero-inated model. Overall,
we nd that the results of the alternative estimators for the eects of mobility are in general agreement
with our main results based on the PSM and GMM estimators.
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6 Conclusions
This paper assesses the quantitative importance of inter-rm labor mobility for invention, using a unique
data set that combines patent applications by Danish rms to the European Patent Oce with matched
employer-employee registry data that track the employment history of R&D workers across time. We
estimate the eect of labor mobility on the total patenting activity of the rms involved in the mobility
event.
In line with the results in the literature, we show that an inow of workers is associated with an increase
in the rm's patenting activity. A worker joining from a patenting rm has a six times higher patenting
productivity than a worker who stays with the rm. Interestingly, worker departure is not associated with
a decrease in patenting. A worker who left to join a patenting rm contributes three times more to the
original rm's patenting activity than a worker that stays, while a worker leaving for a non-patenting rm
has no signicant concomitant eect on patenting. Most importantly, we show that rms are not involved
in a zero-sum game when competing for R&D workers to increase their R&D output. Worker mobility is
related to a positive and statistically signicant increase in total invention by the old and the new employer.
The eect on total invention is strongest for mobility between two patenting rms where a mobility event
increases the total patenting of the rms involved by 0.023. While this number might seem low, it compares
to an average number of 0.064 patents per year for the average rm in our data which implies an increase
of 36 per cent. Mobility between rms with no history of patenting is not associated with a signicant
increase in total patenting.
These results, to the best of our knowledge, provide the rst quantitative support for the notion that
inter-rm mobility stimulates total innovation. Saxenian (1994) in her study of Silicon Valley argues that
\job-hopping" is crucially important for the innovation performance of the rms in that region, and our
results conrm the importance of labor mobility in a much more representative setting covering all types
of industries in Denmark.
A key issue is whether labor mobility causes the observed increase in patenting. We provide several
pieces of evidence supporting such a causal interpretation. First, we show that mobility is associated with
an increase in the probability of the old and the new employer citing each other in subsequent patents,
which suggests that mobility does lead to knowledge transfer between the rms. Second, we nd very
similar results both qualitatively and quantitatively when we instrument labor mobility to reduce concern
that our results might be driven by unobserved factors aecting both hiring and patenting. Finally, we
show that the positive correlation between mobility and patenting is not signicantly related to any large
changes in R&D employment. This again suggests that the positive relationship between these variables is
not caused by some unobserved factor|such as a rm ramping up its R&D activity|that would increase
both.
We see our results as improving our understanding of the circumstances in which labor mobility stim-
ulates rm-level innovation and aggregate growth. However the results in this paper should be interpreted
with caution in relation to drawing conclusions regarding the optimal level of labor turnover in an industry
or region. In a small country such as Denmark, rms are likely to face very similar labor market conditions.
This is advantageous for the econometric identication but the results represent the association between
mobility and patenting given the rate of labor turnover in Denmark. An important factor that must be
considered is how labor turnover aects rms' incentives to invest in R&D. It would clearly be an important
contribution if future work investigated exogenous variation in mobility rates to analyze how this aects
aggregate innovation in an analysis of optimal turnover rates.
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Table 1: Main estimation results
NegBin PSM GMM Poisson PSM
Coe. SE Coe. SE Coe. SE
R&D worker shares
Joiners from patenting rms 1.631*** 0.266 2.389** 1.063 1.458*** 0.397
Joiners from non{patenting rms 0.257 0.360 0.690 0.490 0.338 0.423
Other joiners 1.131*** 0.276 1.168** 0.585 1.250*** 0.352
Support -0.149 0.207 -0.211 0.253 0.321 0.350
Leavers to pat. rms 0.720*** 0.317 1.214* 0.730 0.836*** 0.330
Leavers to non{pat. rms -0.509 0.436 0.126 0.260 -0.936 0.840
Capital and R&D labor
ln(total R&D workers) 0.309*** 0.060 0.374*** 0.093 0.417*** 0.104
ln(capital stock) 0.138*** 0.037 0.008 0.029 0.230*** 0.073
Lagged dependent and pre{sample variables
Dummy patent t  1 1.489*** 0.148 1.450*** 0.305 2.318*** 0.421
ln(# pre-sample patents) 0.316*** 0.079 | | 0.135 0.129
Dummy pre-sample patent 0.325 0.231 | | -0.079 0.281
# of obs. 42,507 23,769 42,507
# of rms 14,516 6,751 14,516
Table 1 displays PSM NegBin, dynamic Poisson xed eects GMM, and PSM Poisson estimation results. \SE"
denotes the standard error. Patent citation weights have not been applied. The PSM specications additionally
include sector dummies, year dummies, region dummies and a constant term. These variables are time{invariant
and drop out of the xed eects GMM specication. The GMM specication uses Wooldridge moment conditions
and additionally contains year dummies. It uses lags of worker shares and the average share of each type of worker
in other rms in the same sector and in the same region as instruments for current worker shares. The asterisks'
`***', `**' and `*' denote marginal signicance at the one, ve and ten percent level.
17
Table 2: Relative patent productivities
r p{value
Joiners from patenting rms 6.277 0.000
Joiners from non{patenting rms 1.833 0.474
Other joiners 4.659 0.000
Support 0.519 0.482
Leavers to patenting rms 3.329 0.031
Leavers to non{patenting rms -0.646 0.242
Table 2 displays the productivities of dierent types of R&D workers relative to the productivity of R&D stayers.
\P   value" denotes the marginal signicance level of the hypothesis that the relative productivity is one. These
calculations are based on the Negbin PSM estimation results displayed in Table 1. Reading example: joiners
from patenting rms are 6.3 times more patent{productive than R&D stayers.
Table 3: Total eects of mobility
Left for Left for
patenting non{patenting
rm rm
Coecient p{value Coecient p{value
Average rm
Joiners from patenting rms 0.020 0.000 0.009 0.023
Joiners from non{patenting rms 0.008 0.033 -0.002 0.643
Average rm with at least one pre-sample patent
Joiners from patenting rms 0.046 0.000 0.022 0.023
Joiners from non{patenting rms 0.019 0.033 -0.005 0.643
Table 3 displays our estimates of the total change in the number of patents if one worker (of dierent types)
left the rm while one worker (of dierent types) joins the rm, keeping total R&D employment constant. The
upper panel displays our results across all observations and the lower panel shows results for rms with at least
one pre{sample patent. These calculations are based on the Negbin PSM estimation results displayed in Table
1. Reading example: if one R&D worker leaves for a patenting rm and one worker previously employed by a
patenting rm joins, the expected increase in the number of patents is 0.020 for the average rm.
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Table 4: Linear regression results for the relationship between R&D worker mobility and citations
Base Industry Firm
specication & year characteristics
Coe. SE Coe. SE Coe. SE
Forward worker mobility only 0.010*** 0.003 0.009*** 0.003 0.009*** 0.003
Reverse worker mobility only 0.016*** 0.006 0.016*** 0.006 0.015*** 0.006
Bi{directional ow of workers 0.047* 0.026 0.047* 0.026 0.045* 0.026
Year dummies no yes yes
Industry dummies no yes yes
Firm characteristics no no yes
Table 4 displays linear regression results for a rm's probability to cite another rm's patents. The results to the
left refer to the base model which includes the three worker ow terms and a constant. The specication in the
middle additionally includes year and dummies for rms being in the same industry. The model to the right also
includes the log number of R&D workers of the citing rm, the log number of R&D workers of the cited rm, and
the lagged log stock of patent applications. Years 2000 through 2004 are included. There are 516,049 dyads, 141
non-zero citation links, 1,011 instances of rms linked by a forward mobility link only, 866 instances of reverse links,
and 168 instances of bi-directional mobility links. \SE" denotes the standard error. Standard errors are clustered
at the rm{level. The asterisks `***' and `*' denote marginal signicance at the one and ten percent level.
19
Table 5: Large vs small changes in R&D employment
Change # Change # Change #
R&D workers R&D workers R&D workers
>100% or >100% or >50% or
>10 workers >5 workers >10 workers
Coe. SE Coe. SE Coe. SE
R&D worker shares
Joiners from patenting rms 1.419*** 0.465 1.303*** 0.491 1.444*** 0.555
Joiners from non{patenting rms -0.271 0.816 -0.202 0.813 -0.260 0.937
Other joiners 1.465*** 0.463 1.484*** 0.462 1.604*** 0.467
Support -0.086 0.240 -0.087 0.240 -0.071 0.242
Leavers to pat. rms 0.471 0.421 0.474 0.427 0.456 0.440
Leavers to non{pat. rms -0.759 0.513 -0.766 0.520 -0.766 0.509
\Large change" interactions
Share joiners pat. rms  large change 0.859 0.994 1.172 0.943 0.570 0.831
Share joiners non{pat. rms  large change 1.734 1.097 1.477 1.133 1.051 1.133
Share other joiners  large change -0.398 2.464 -1.254 2.446 -1.524 1.438
Capital and R&D labor
ln(total R&D workers) 0.321*** 0.064 0.322*** 0.065 0.333*** 0.064
ln(capital stock) 0.121*** 0.043 0.122*** 0.043 0.119*** 0.043
Lagged dependent and pre{sample variables
Dummy patent t  1 1.541*** 0.163 1.539*** 0.163 1.540*** 0.163
ln(# pre-sample patents) 0.295*** 0.085 0.295*** 0.085 0.294*** 0.085
Dummy pre-sample patent 0.459 0.284 0.452 0.287 0.454 0.284
Tests for joint signicance F-test p-value F-test p-value F-test p-value
Joint signicance interaction terms 4.18 0.242 4.15 0.246 2.56 0.465
Table 5 displays NegBin PSM results that include interactions of the three dierent shares of joiners with a
dummy variable that is coded one if there was a \large change" in the total number of R&D workers. A \large
change" is dened in three dierent ways: (i) Change in R&D employment by more than 100 percent or a total
change by more than ten workers (left part), (ii) change in R&D employment by more than 100 percent or a total
change by more than ve workers (middle part), (iii) change in R&D employment by more than 50 percent or a
total change by more than ten workers (right part). The denitions of \large changes" involve two{year lags which
reduces the number of observations and the number of rms to 27,199 and 9,438 respectively. The specication
additionally includes sector dummies, year dummies, region dummies and a constant term. The asterisk `***'
denotes marginal signicance at the one percent level.
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics
Obs. without pre{ Obs. with pre{
All obs. sample patents sample patents
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent variable
# patent appl. t 0.064 | 0.015 | 0.761 |
Dummy patent t  1 0.019 | 0.005 | 0.209 |
R&D worker shares
Share joiners from pat. rms 0.014 0.089 0.013 0.089 0.026 0.089
Share joiners from non{pat. rms 0.062 0.199 0.063 0.203 0.046 0.122
Share other joiners 0.051 0.182 0.052 0.186 0.043 0.122
Share support 0.457 0.441 0.460 0.447 0.423 0.337
Share leavers to pat. rms 0.014 0.091 0.013 0.089 0.032 0.110
Share leavers to non{pat. rms 0.077 0.244 0.077 0.248 0.074 0.184
Capital and R&D employment
Total R&D workers 7.693 44.570 5.473 25.694 39.043 140.253
Cap. stock (in mio. DKK) 77.50 1'280 54.80 1'140 399.00 2'520
Year dummies (base: 2000)
2001 0.203 | 0.202 | 0.206 |
2002 0.196 | 0.196 | 0.202 |
2003 0.187 | 0.187 | 0.190 |
2004 0.183 | 0.183 | 0.181 |
Sector dummies (base: Wholesale and retail trade)
Farm & food 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.019 |
Textiles & paper 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.036 |
Plastic & glass 0.026 | 0.023 | 0.072 |
Chemicals 0.014 | 0.011 | 0.054 |
Metals 0.049 | 0.047 | 0.084 |
Machinery 0.069 | 0.057 | 0.233 |
Electrics 0.030 | 0.028 | 0.067 |
Medical technology 0.018 | 0.015 | 0.063 |
Vehicles 0.007 | 0.006 | 0.021 |
Furniture 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.021 |
IT 0.070 | 0.072 | 0.035 |
Technical services 0.140 | 0.141 | 0.127 |
Business{related services 0.095 | 0.099 | 0.044 |
Other 0.180 | 0.191 | 0.023 |
Region dummies (base: Greater Copenhagen)
Sjlland 0.097 | 0.098 | 0.088 |
Syd 0.224 | 0.223 | 0.237 |
Midt 0.207 | 0.208 | 0.196 |
Nord 0.074 | 0.073 | 0.090 |
Pre{sample variables
# pre{sample patents 0.061 1.465 | | 0.929 5.625
Dummy pre{sample pat. 0.000 | | | | |
# observations 42'507 39'696 2'811
The Table displays descriptive statistics for the entire set of observations, for observations with a pre{sample patent
and for those without a pre{sample patent. \SD" denotes the standard deviation.
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Appendix B: Table of correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) Share joiners from pat. firms 1
(2) Share joiners from non{pat. firms -0.032 1
(3) Share other joiners -0.002 -0.050 1
(4) Share support -0.115 -0.253 -0.240 1
(5) Share leavers to pat. firms 0.070 0.022 0.040 -0.084 1
(6) Share leavers to non{pat. firms 0.024 0.092 0.082 -0.172 0.043 1
(7) ln(cap. stock) 0.016 -0.030 -0.059 0.100 0.025 -0.003 1
(8) ln(total R&D workers) 0.031 -0.017 -0.025 -0.067 0.055 0.030 0.410 1
(9) Dummy patent t   1 0.042 -0.007 0.003 -0.029 0.033 -0.009 0.151 0.264 1
(10) ln(# pre-sample patents) 0.038 -0.020 -0.009 -0.027 0.055 -0.004 0.227 0.349 0.451 1
(11) Dummy pre-sample patent 0.036 -0.022 -0.012 -0.020 0.053 -0.003 0.218 0.315 0.375 0.950 1
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